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Abstract 
The delivery of housing to low income citizens across South Africa reflects the state’s realisation of 
citizens’ social rights to housing and can help to strengthen a citizen’s sense of belonging. 
Additionally, through the very processes of housing delivery, such as decentralised mechanisms with 
strong community participation, principles of inclusive citizenship are forged and enacted. However, 
it is argued in this paper that because housing allocation is devolved and power granted to local 
elites, an important aspect of citizenship-making has also been devolved with insufficient checks and 
balances. The paper cautions that the decision-making of local elites who determine access to 
housing and thus the realisation of citizenship rights, is mitigated by their subjectivities. Based on 
case studies of selected settlements in eThekwini (Durban), the paper examines how residents 
access housing in slum upgrade programmes. It finds that, beyond national eligibility criteria 
additional localised criteria are evident which demands that residents use their identity and social 
relationships to both provide evidence of their eligibility and negotiate access. The paper further 
cautions that these local processes may be sowing of conflict by propagating existing social tensions, 
particularly around ethno- and xenophobia, and party political contests. Such conflict ultimately 
undermines citizenship ideals.  
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1. Introduction  
This paper examines the politics and process of housing allocation in three settlements in eThekwini 
Municipality (Durban). This examination is conceptually framed by a discussion of the relationship 
between housing and citizenship. Recent literature on low income housing interventions emphasise 
that poorer members of society have a right to housing, that states have a responsibility to uphold 
this right, and that through participation in decision-making over housing design, delivery and 
management poorer citizens are able to exercise agency and other social rights including the right to 
participate in political society (Bredenoord et al., 2014). The conceptualisation of housing as a social 
right and of housing processes as a means to exercise a range of other rights, complements recent 
conceptualisations of citizenship that move beyond a formal-legal relationship between citizen and 
the state to emphasise its local (Lund, 2011) and substantive (Holston and Appadurai, 1999; Holston, 
2008) character. The section that follows provides a critical overview of the interstices between 
housing and citizenship, before discussing the case of South Africa and the particular relationship 
between housing and citizenship which gives rise to current housing allocation processes.  
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The empirical evidence illustrates housing allocation processes in action. The evidence draws on 
research on the implementation of informal settlement upgrade in three settlements in eThekwini: 
Gum Tree Road, Cato Crest and Zwelisha, each at different stages in the upgrade process. The paper 
analyses the plural institutions (i.e. rules, practices and processes) that govern settlement upgrading 
through a lens of inclusive citizenship. The evidence suggests that devolved housing allocation 
processes also devolve an important aspect of citizenship-making with insufficient checks on the 
power of ‘citizen-makers’ i.e. local elites. In the South African context, citizenship-making refers to 
both the outcome of delivering on a Constitutional right to housing and inclusion in the participatory 
processes through which housing is delivered; both of which appear contingent on the subjectivities 
of local elites. The conclusion draws upon the work of Moser and Horn (2011) and Beall et al. (2013) 
on urban conflict  to make sense of the perceptible tensions that influence housing allocation and to 
identify its future implications1. The findings from the three case studies may be helpful to the 
design and implementation of upgrade strategies in other places in terms of the need for oversight 
and transparency in housing allocation processes and the necessity for checks and balances on the 
power of local elites.  
The data for the case studies are drawn from 24 ethnographic accounts collected over nine months 
between 2009 and 2010, and from respondents identified to reflect the diversity in the three 
settlements (in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, nationality, tenure status and years of residence). 
These accounts were developed from semi-structured interviews, social relations mapping, 
community mapping, oral histories and reciprocity diaries kept by respondents. They were 
supplemented by a review of secondary literature and 18 semi-structured interviews with 
professionals engaged in the upgrade process in eThekwini, including local councillors, members of 
Ward and community development committees, municipal housing officers, housing consultants and 
a master builder. These interviews were also conducted between 2009 and 2010. 
2. Conceptualising the relationship between housing and citizenship  
Citizenship is a multi-faceted concept; Staeheli (2010) writes citizenship is continually constructed 
through re-articulations of the relationship between different social actors. It can refer to the legal 
terms and conditions of membership to a nation-state; or it can refer to claims, based on moral or 
social rights, to membership to society and the practice of these claims. These constructions of 
citizenship are conceptually distinguished by Holston (2008) as formal and substantive citizenship 
respectively. Kabeer (2005) adds the articulation of substantive rights by marginalised groups can be 
labelled a call for inclusive citizenship. An inclusive citizenship moves beyond the civil and political 
rights of individuals in liberal theory, to the social and economic rights that give substance to civil 
and political rights. Lister (2007:50-51, in a summary of Kabeer, 2005) explains inclusive citizenship 
as conceptualised ‘from below’ holds four ideals: justice and equity, horizontal relations that enable 
acts of solidarity, and two ideals relevant to my findings: recognition of all people as rights-bearers, 
                                                          
1 There are many types of conflict. In housing processes some have constructive potential e.g. a conflict 
environment can create opportunities for unusual alliances (see Sanyal and Mukhija, 2001). This paper is 
concerned with aspects of ‘civic conflict’ - that is the contests and clashes that arise in urban areas in response 
to or as a result of the failures of the state and its actors e.g. elected politicians, government officials and 
members of committees engaged in a public process vis-à-vis their widely perceived responsibilities to citizens 
(Beall et. al. 2013); and with the idea of an urban ‘tipping point’ i.e. a determining factor that ‘tips’ conflict into 
violence (Moser and Horn, 2011). 
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and the right to self-determination. To Parnell and Pieterse (2010), the realisation of inclusive 
citizenship demands an interventionist state. They argue that “the multi-scalar nature of the state’s 
actions […] are necessary for the full realization of human rights” (2010: 146). Parnell and Pieterse’s 
argument alerts us to the importance of the multi-scalar state to any analysis of housing rights and 
their realisation. Their argument influenced the focus of this paper to devolved housing processes 
and their effect on citizenship rights. 
It is worth noting that dominant conceptualisations of citizenship affect the role of housing delivery 
in advancing (or denying) citizenship agendas. ‘Housing rights’ and the ‘right to housing’ is a useful 
distinction to illustrate this. Housing rights refer to the legal right to hold property and the 
conditions under which property is held. This is backed by formal institutions e.g. courts and state 
bureaucracy (King, 2003). Housing rights fall into two categories: positive and negative rights with 
implications for housing policy. Where negative rights protect individuals and their property from 
coercion, King (1998 in King, 2003:53) argues the state should not play a role as a provider of 
housing as it cannot be a neutral actor and favouring one set of citizens impinges on the rights of 
others. Positive rights, by contrast, have an enabling function so individuals can exercise their 
membership to society. In Marshall and Bottomore’s (1992 [1950]) formulation of citizenship, state 
provision of social welfare (including the provision of housing) is essential for a “full citizenship” of 
political, social and civil rights. In a formal citizenship, developed on principles of positive rights, 
housing is a social right and the state an important actor with a central role in delivering it 
(Bengtsson, 2001).   
Precise housing rights enacted in law are based on a particular interpretation that wins from an 
array of articulations of a moral or social right to housing (illustrated in Kabeer, 2005). In recent 
years the practice of moral or social rights to housing has been theorised as a substantive citizenship 
where, for example, informal settlement is understood as the actions of citizens that simultaneously 
realise their right to housing and in some way contest the state’s monopoly on determining the 
legitimacy with which people stake claims to space and belonging (Alsayyad and Roy, 2006; Desai 
and Sanyal, 2012; Holston and Appadurai, 1999; Roy, 2009). A corollary discourse to substantive 
rights to housing is advanced by development practitioners and activists and is encompassed by 
ideals of universal human rights. While literature on substantive citizenship often emphasises the 
ways people make and sustain claims to space often despite state efforts to marginalise them (e.g. 
demarcating spaces ‘informal’, Roy, 2009; and dwellers as ‘encroachers’, Benjamin, 2008), literature 
on inclusive citizenship and the creation of inclusive cities articulates a role for the state based on 
the idea of poor people’s ‘right to the city’ (Beall, 2000; Parnell and Pieterse, 2010).  
In a state-centric view of inclusive citizenship the precise role of the state in delivering housing 
varies. Since a powerful neo-liberal development agenda in the 1980s and 1990s rolled back state 
functions, the state as house builder has given way to the state as an enabler of housing markets 
(Gilbert, 2004). In this role, Bredenoord et al. (2014:4) identify three basic principles that advance 
inclusive agendas in housing delivery processes and their outcomes. The first is a holistic approach to 
housing that incorporates frameworks of sustainable environmental management and 
neighbourhood-level economic activities that “are essential preconditions to reduce urban poverty 
and to redistribute resources in such a way as to include the urban poor in the formal city” (2014:4). 
The second is partnerships with civil society and private sector actors (also in Jenkins and Smith, 
2001). And the third is the “active involvement and participation of the inhabitants” (ibid). The 
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structured participation of shack dwellers is a driving discourse in good development practice that 
materialises in top-down housing delivery programmes, including those in South Africa.   
Despite warnings over the inclusive claims of participatory processes and their potentially subversive 
role in cementing local hierarchies of power and disciplining citizens into formal channels of 
communication with the state (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Miraftab, 2009; Benjamin, 2008), Lister 
(2007:53) argues that for marginalised people socio-economic rights are indivisible from civil and 
political rights, which means that to achieve inclusive citizenship poor people must participate in 
poverty reduction strategies and policy-making. Lister writes, “[Their inclusion] represent[s] a 
demand for recognition of and respect for the expertise borne of experience alongside those forms 
of knowledge and expertise that have traditionally been privileged” (2007:53). Among shack dweller 
movements such as Slum/Shack Dwellers International participatory processes of housing delivery 
exemplify inclusive citizenship and a bottom-up enactment of a ‘right to the city’ (Mayer, 2012:69-
70), where citizens not only lead in the design, build and management of housing, but subsequently 
develop strategic positions to engage and negotiate other gains with the state (Boonyabancha, 2005; 
Chitekwe-Biti, Patel and Mitlin, 2014).  
Inclusive citizenship is bound within processes of housing delivery for both the state and 
marginalised citizens. The concept of inclusive citizenship serves as the analytical lens to understand 
the promise and pitfalls of housing delivery processes in South Africa. 
3. Housing delivery and citizenship in South Africa 
Drawing upon policy documents, primary data, and secondary literature, this section discusses two 
perspectives on housing delivery2 and inclusive citizenship in South Africa: from the state (where I 
shall draw out references to participatory approaches in delivery) and from citizens (where I draw 
out ideas of all people as rights-bearers and the right to self-determination). Tomlinson (2011) 
identifies four areas of housing delivery: planning, procurement, project management and 
allocation. It is important to note here that housing allocation in the South African context includes 
houses allocated under informal settlement upgrade programmes where such settlements are re-
planned and cleared shacks are replaced by newly-built subsidised houses complete with services 
and legal tenure. The paper focuses on housing allocation as it is the point at which the state 
(through powers devolved to municipalities) and citizen most closely interact. In informal settlement 
upgrade programmes, it is where citizens tend to participate in the process of developing housing 
lists and matching households to houses (Tomlinson, 2011:422-423). Thus, the housing allocation 
process and its outcome (award of a house) is an important mechanism through which citizens can 
claim membership to an inclusive polity.  
3.1 A state-centric view of housing delivery and allocation for inclusive citizenship 
3.1.1 Constitutional housing rights and formal citizenship 
                                                          
2Actors engaged in low income housing delivery include private sector developers, community groups building 
state-assisted (e.g. the People’s Housing Process) and non-assisted self-help housing, and state-delivered 
public housing. The focus here is on state delivered public housing as it is by far the largest and most dominant 
mechanism of low income housing delivery in the country (Landman and Napier, 2010). 
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The 1996 South African Constitution makes two provisions for inclusive citizenship through housing: 
a legal right to adequate housing and provision for the devolution of power for housing delivery to 
local government. These provisions reflect housing as a positive right and its delivery as part of a 
formal citizenship. Formal citizenship is a membership to society on the grounds of nationality, 
which in South Africa is attained through birth, descent or naturalisation. It can make less important 
identities of ethnicity, race and language which otherwise form the basis for membership to society 
(Holston and Appadurai, 1999). The South African experience of racist and ethnically divisive law, 
policy and practices in the location, ownership and use of land and housing necessitated the 
articulation of all South Africans’ legal right to housing as a way to redress past injustices and to 
contribute to the creation of a common South African with a common set of rights (Lalloo, 1999; 
Bentley and Habib, 2008). Article 26 Housing in the Bill of Rights declares that “Everyone has the 
right to have access to adequate housing [and that] The state must take reasonable legislative and 
other measures [within its available resources] to achieve the progressive realisation of this right” 
(GoRSA, 1996, Chapter 2). This Constitutional right establishes the responsibilities citizens expect the 
state to fulfil. Although, illustrated by an early Constitutional test case in Cape Town (the Grootboom 
case3), this formal citizenship right does not necessarily equal a substantive right to housing.  
Writing in 1995, Mark Orkin argued that for a non-racial, non-sexist democracy South Africa would 
need processes that support the democratisation of state and society, and that a repressive style of 
government needed to be reversed by processes that demanded the active involvement of the 
citizenry; making the case that through devolved processes and active citizen engagement, inclusive 
citizenship can be engendered4. The Constitution makes explicit that the country is governed by 
three spheres of government: national, provincial and local, each with distinctive realms of authority 
(GoRSA, 1996, Chapter 3). Although, housing is listed as a national and provincial function (Schedule 
4, Part A), local government is identified as the authority responsible for building regulations, 
municipal planning and municipal public works (Schedule 4, Part B), making capable local authorities 
the most appropriate sphere for delivering housing. Tomlinson (2011:421) notes, “While the 
Constitution does not specify housing as a local government function, it clearly provides a route for 
municipalities […] to take on this function through the principle of devolution.” The 1997 Housing 
Act made explicit provision for municipal engagement in national housing programmes through their 
role in preparing Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) that specified housing needs in the 
municipality (GoRSA, 1997).  
3.1.2 Devolved housing delivery and allocation: the ‘RDP’ (1994-2004), ‘BNG’ (2004 – 2009) 
and Outcome 8 (2010 -) 
The ‘RDP’ 
                                                          
3Mrs. Grootboom lived in an informal settlement in Cape Town. Alongside others, she moved to occupy land 
reserved for low income housing. Their shacks were cleared from this new land by the municipality. Unable to 
return to their previous homes they moved onto a nearby sports field. A Constitutional Court judgement found 
in favour of Grootboom and reaffirmed the responsibility of the state (and not local authorities) to ensure the 
delivery of adequate housing including interim housing solutions. The Grootboom case illustrated that 
Constitutional housing rights did not translate into substantive rights to housing and that directives forged by 
the state did not necessarily carry to local authorities charged with service delivery (Williams, 2005; 
Huchzermeyer, 2004). 
4 A view echoed in the 1996 Habitat Agenda which recognised the decentralisation of state authority and 
resources as a key instrument for inclusive and sustainable human settlements (UN-Habitat, 2009) 
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The main mechanism to deliver state housing to low income households outlined in the 1994 
Housing White Paper was through a one-off capital subsidy to individual households (GoRSA, 1995). 
This mechanism paid little attention to municipal and public participation (Tomlinson, 2011; 
Huchzermeyer, 2004). This stands in contrast to the strong participatory principles embedded in the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) of the African National Congress (ANC) 
government under which housing policy was forged (lending its acronym to the product i.e. ‘RDP 
houses’) (Goodlad, 1996). Reasons vary as to why. Lalloo (1999) and others (e.g. Terreblanche, 2012; 
Jenkins and Smith, 2001) argue the diverse voices from civil society heard in the formation of 
housing policy diminished with the negotiations that brought about change in the post-apartheid 
political order, leaving a market-based approach where private sector contractors played a major 
role in delivering a socio-economic right to housing. Although Tomlinson (2011) notes private sector 
delivery was in part a way to overcome the anticipated disruption of local government 
transformation following 1996 local elections. And Miraftab (2003) adds that against a housing 
backlog of 2.8 million the imperative for housing units overrode requirements for the “active 
participation of communities in decisions that affect their lives” (2003:233). 
In a mass delivery model where housing units were hastily and poorly constructed on the urban 
periphery with minimal beneficiary participation, the process of housing allocation was a largely 
bureaucratic process of pairing eligible households with available houses. Those eligible were to 
apply for a housing subsidy through local or provincial government. The official national criteria for 
eligibility for a subsidised house have remained broadly the same over the years:  
1. Be a South African citizen or have a permanent residence certificate5. 
2. Married, cohabiting with a partner or single with dependants. 
3. Have never owned property. 
4. Have never received a government housing subsidy. 
5. Be 21 years or older6. 
6. Joint household income should not exceed R3,500 per month. 
Records of eligible applicants were kept on a national database which served in effect as a waiting 
list. As subsidy-built houses became available eligible people would move in7. This approach meant 
long waiting lists with the time elapsed between allocation and receipt of a house, in some cases, 
being 10 years (Huchzermeyer, 2014). Those eligible were expected to wait for a house to become 
available, although tales of corruption in this process abound (Rubin, 2011). 
The ‘BNG’ 
After 10 years of insufficient delivery and widespread complaints about the product and process 
(Goebel, 2007:292 lists common complaints) the government was forced to re-assess its housing 
delivery programme. ‘Breaking New Ground: A Comprehensive Plan for the Development of 
Sustainable Human Settlements (or ‘BNG’, GoRSA, 2004), was a major policy redirection. Its guiding 
policy was the creation of “South African towns and cities [that are ] [...] socially and spatially 
                                                          
5 At the time of fieldwork in 2009-10, only South Africa citizens were eligible, not permanent residents (Patel, 
2012:95). 
6 At the time of fieldwork in 2009-10, the age of eligibility was 18 years or above (ibid) 
7 In eThekwini Municipality this process was supplemented by a lottery where eligible households who applied 
could be randomly selected for a house. (Tissington et al., 2013) 
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inclusive” (GoRSA, 2004:11). The policy lent support to in situ upgrading8 and articulated new 
processes to create “Sustainable human settlements [that] are supportive of the communities which 
reside [there], thus contributing towards greater social cohesion, social crime prevention, moral 
regeneration, support for national heritage, recognition and support of indigenous knowledge 
systems, and the ongoing extension of land rights.” (ibid). Housing delivery aimed higher than the 
promise of a house.  
Although BNG stated an enhanced role for the private sector, it made two noteworthy statements 
on the role of municipalities and citizens in housing delivering. The first, municipalities were to 
assume overall responsibility for housing in their area “through a greater devolution of responsibility 
and resources to municipalities” (GoRSA, 2004:16). eThekwini Municipality with its dedicated 
housing unit was one of the few municipalities prepared to assume these responsibilities, many 
were not (Tomlinson, 2011). The second, beneficiary communities were to be mobilised through a 
comprehensive communication strategy, dedicated municipal community liaison officer, and the 
engagement of Ward Committees (the lowest level of formal governance). The participation of 
beneficiaries was a strong feature in programmes to upgrade informal settlements (e.g. (Revised) 
Housing Code, GoRSA, 2009: Part 3). In eThekwini, in situ upgrade is now the mechanism through 
which the greatest number of subsidised housing is delivered (Interview with senior municipal 
officer, 06/10/09). In South Africa, in situ upgrade constitutes the demolition of shacks and the 
construction of subsided houses in a re-planned settlement with subsidy-eligible residents relocated 
to temporary ‘transit’ housing in between these two phases.  
BNG also articulated the role of municipalities in housing allocation. Tomlinson (2011:423) explains: 
“The local authority is expected to develop a demand database, manage housing lists, take 
applications for housing subsidies and match households to houses in terms of the need assessment 
carried out during the IDP process.” Although, she notes, provinces (including KwaZulu-Natal 
Province) have been known to override the housing lists of beneficiaries developed by 
municipalities. In eThekwini Municipality because of the emphasis on in situ upgrade, housing 
subsidies are awarded to eligible residents through a municipality-managed project and site-specific 
register (Tissington et. al., 2013). This means eThekwini differs from other major municipalities in 
Gauteng and the Western Cape (for example) where general non-site specific housing lists are 
mainly employed (ibid). However, given the current national policy direction for housing delivery 
(discussed below), the implications that arise from examining in detail housing allocation processes 
in cases of in situ upgrades in eThekwini, can be far reaching in their relevance to other 
municipalities in the country. 
‘Outcome 8’ 
Despite a large housing programme that delivered 3.03 million subsidised housing units between 
1994 and mid-2010 (Gordon et al., 2011:28), the current housing backlog is estimated to be 2.2 
million units. In response to the backlog, the government launched ‘Outcome 8’ in 2010 which aims 
to deliver 400,000 upgraded units in informal settlements by 2014 principally by scaling-up and 
reinvigorating existing upgrade programmes (Financial and Fiscal Commission, 2012:13). Evaluations 
of existing programmes overwhelmingly focus on the institutional barriers that are stalling scaling-up 
                                                          
8 Through the ‘Upgrading of Informal Settlements Programme’ under the 2004 National Housing Code (GoRSA, 
2004) and further detailed under the revised 2009 Housing Code (GoRSA, 2009). 
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(ibid), such as a lack of knowledge in municipalities of the processes and planning principles of the 
government’s Upgrading Informal Settlements Programme. Scrutiny of how processes are 
implemented, particularly around housing allocation, is largely absent.  
Nonetheless, in 2013, the Deputy Minister of Human Settlements Zou Kota-Fredericks stressed the 
participatory nature of informal settlement upgrade that is to typify Outcome 8 projects. She 
declared, “We have directed that the planning and implementation of these projects should be 
carried out with the participation of the affected communities … and have agreed with the 
Presidency that the 1,800 informal settlements [targeted] […] should all have detailed project plans 
[…] produced through participatory processes” (Kota-Fredericks, 2013:7). In the spirit of inclusive 
development and empowering people to engage in settlement upgrading, Kota-Fredericks’ and the 
President’s commitment to participatory processes is desirable and necessary. The paper now turns 
to three cases where participatory processes were employed in housing delivery and allocation; the 
evidence identifies issues that ought to be of concern wherever participatory processes are 
employed in in situ upgrades. 
3.1.3 Structured participation in housing allocation processes 
Across the country, the process of upgrading informal settlements is decentralised and power 
devolved to municipalities (see Figure 1 for a detailed breakdown of the process).  
As part of initiatives for greater community participation, settlement level actors are very involved in 
the upgrading process. They include the members of a Ward Committee or community development 
committee (CDC) – the CDC is composed of elected residents whose powers and responsibilities are 
determined by locally developed norms and rules. Not all settlements have a functioning CDC. The 
CDC sits beneath the Ward Committee but has no official powers or responsibilities, unlike Ward 
Committees, which were developed through national legislation to bridge gaps of communication 
and representation between local councillors and residents (GoRSA, CoGTA, 2009). Ward 
Committees comprise the ward councillor and 10 nominated representatives, whose term in office is 
set by the municipality. There are no criteria to govern the nomination of ward representatives. The 
functionality and competence of Ward Committees varies widely across the country (ibid, p.33).  
In all three study sites, the settlements were in the process of an in situ upgrade implemented in the 
spirit of community participation. In reality, community participation was limited (Patel, 2013), for 
example settlement-level actors were not involved in the design of houses or in the evaluation of the 
upgrade programme. Instead, members of the CDC and/or Ward Committee had three main roles: 
they were responsible for drawing up lists of eligible residents (housing lists), monitoring newcomers 
so they did not take advantage of the settlement’s upgrade, and facilitating the entry and exit of 
municipal officials and housing professionals (e.g. builders, surveyors and engineers). Those involved 
in these tasks were afforded great flexibility in precisely how to interpret their role(s) in the upgrade 
process, creating opportunities for them to manipulate the process according to their personal and 
political preferences. The current process through which sites for upgrade are selected and subsidy-
built houses allocated leaves room for extra localised criteria set by local elites who include 
councillors, Ward Committee members and CDC members, who collaborate with each other and 
municipal officers to different degrees. These additional criteria have two dimensions: process and 
preference. 
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Figure 1: Site selection and housing allocation in the upgrade process in eThekwini Municipality 
 Source: The figure is adapted from a table in Patel, 2012 
Level 
Responsibility for site selection 
and housing allocation 
Criteria for housing 
subsidy 
Function Monitoring Mechanism 
Department of 
Human 
Settlements 
(Province) 
Not directly involved in site 
selection or housing allocation.  
Individual eligibility for 
housing subsidy 
Monitor target to eliminate slums by 
2014.  
Release funds from national to municipal 
at milestones  
Municipalities report on progress towards 
achieving the targets.  
Housing Unit 
(feasibility) 
(Municipality) 
Sites selected on the basis of 
both the technical ease of 
upgrade and political 
considerations.  
Housing allocation determined by 
settlement actors who are 
responsible for developing a list 
of eligible people.  
Individual eligibility for 
housing subsidy 
*Land acquisition studies  
*Impact assessments  
*Land surveys  
*Full costing 
*Plans and architectural drawings  
Feasibility studies are usually outsourced to 
contractors – monitoring against individual 
contracts.  
Little monitoring of how the housing list is 
developed.  
Project Manager, 
Housing Unit 
(implementation) 
(Municipality) 
PM appoints a community liaison 
officer (CLO), who works with 
community committees and the 
local councillor to oversee the 
allocation of plots and subsidies 
and coordinate upgrade work.  
Individual eligibility for 
housing subsidy 
*Implement upgrade  
*Manage and coordinate contractors 
and others 
*Principal municipal contact for 
community  
*Ensures houses are allocated to 
residents from the target area 
Internal audit systems, feedback and reporting 
from contractors, CLO, community committees 
and the councillor.  
Settlement 
Area Committees, Ward 
Committees, CDC and councillor 
compile housing list.  
Individuals living in a 
settlement prior to a 
cut-off date.  
*Decide names on the housing list  
*Facilitate on-site works 
*Monitor newcomers  
No official monitoring or scrutiny of who is on 
the housing list.  
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Criteria that relate to process primarily concern how long a subsidy-eligible individual has lived in the 
settlement targeted for upgrade. The addition of a ‘cut off’ date, typically set by municipal officers in 
close consultation with the local councillor, Ward Committee and CDC, has two intentions: the first is 
to dis-incentivise the arrival of newcomers because of concerns that if news of an upgrade spreads 
many people will move into the area to try and obtain a house; and the second is to rationalise the 
allocation of housing units, the numbers of which are constrained by available space. Spatial 
constraints on upgrade sites arise from planning and design principles, cultural preferences and 
topography. For example, current design principles stipulate a plot size between 30m² - 40m² per 
household; a planning ethos of ‘one shack – one house’ has been adopted; there is popular 
resistance to terraced or multi-storey housing9; and Durban’s hilly terrain adds technical 
complications to in situ upgrade, with implications for the number of units that can be built on 
existing sites (see figure 2). In two of the three case studies (Cato Crest and Gum Tree Road), the 
number of subsidy-built housing units did not equal the number of subsidy-eligible residents. This 
heightened tensions between eligible residents for access to the limited numbers of houses in the 
upgraded area.  
Figure 2 High densities and steep gradients in Gum Tree Road 
  
Source: Photo taken by author, August, 2010 
The second set of criteria is related to the preferences of local elites – which in all three case study 
areas were found to have strong ethnic and party political dimensions. Preferences are inferred from 
the behaviour of eligible and non-eligible residents in the study sites, and their interpretation of the 
actions and statements of Ward Committee and CDC members. These actors are believed to 
implicitly prefer members of the ANC over those of other political parties, isiZulu over isiXhosa 
                                                          
9 The Area Manager of the Cato Manor Area Based Management Programme noted that at public meetings it 
is common to hear, “where can I bury my ancestors if I live in a flat?”, or “how can I build more rooms if I have 
neighbours on either side?” This may reflect a need to accommodate a growing family, generate income by 
building rooms for rent or a wish to retain culturally important practices (Interview with Area Manager, 
09/09/09).  
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speakers10, and South Africans over foreigners11. While the criteria are resolutely local in their 
application, there is an interesting scalar element to them, which illustrates that ‘the local’ cannot 
be an isolated scale of analysis and that what materialises at ‘the local’ level reflects regional and 
national flows of power (in the case of ANC membership), political and ethnic tensions (in 
preferences for amaZulu), and widespread public debate (on the role of foreigners in South Africa).   
Among respondents, the first widely believed criterion in the politics of preference was membership 
to the ANC over other political parties. The belief among low income residents that party 
membership facilitates access to state resources nominally available to all South African citizens has 
been well documented in other studies (e.g. Rubin, 201112; Benit-Gbaffou, 2012). Benit-Gbaffou’s 
(2012) study of party politics and local democracy in Johannesburg illustrates that actually local ANC 
branches are a powerful, influential and highly visible entity that can bring opportunities and 
improved service delivery to its members, especially in places where Ward Committees do not 
function effectively by channelling issues ‘up’ the ANC hierarchy, or through “personal ANC 
network[s] to have their view considered at higher scales and levels of power.” (2012:181). The 
study illustrates that the widespread belief of residents as to the power of grassroots ANC 
membership is not without merit. In the three case study sites the corresponding ward was 
governed by an ANC councillor, and the Ward Committee and CDC were dominated by members of 
the ANC, many of whom were active in their local ANC branch. Thus, awarding ANC branch members 
a stake in resource allocation through their official roles in committees only serves to strengthen the 
association between ANC membership and access to housing.  
A further dimension to the preference of ANC membership over other political parties may be 
related to the historic party political tension and contest between the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) 
and the ANC in KwaZulu-Natal. The contest for political power between IFP and ANC supporters 
leading up to and after the end of apartheid led to brutal communal violence across the province. In 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, episodes of communal violence, predominantly in rural areas, drove 
many internally displaced people to urban areas, determining the pattern of settlements in which 
many poor urban Africans live in the province today. Despite the dominance of the ANC in local and 
national elections since 1994, apartheid-era antagonism between the IFP and ANC is still evident in 
contemporary local politics. For example, during a spate of political assassinations preceding the 
national elections in 2009, the IFP Youth Chairman Bhekinkosi Dube was shot dead in northern 
KwaZulu-Natal, shortly followed by ANC Youth League leader S'thembiso Cele in Durban in a possible 
reprisal (Memela, 2009).  
The second widely believed criterion, which is closely related to the politics of the ANC, is ethnicity.  
The discourse of ethnicity was at the forefront of national politics leading up to the 2009 presidential 
elections, when Jacob Zuma’s political campaign seemed to rest on evoking his ethnic and gender 
identity as a Zulu man, and the strong leadership characteristics attributed by his supporters to this 
                                                          
10 isiXhosa speakers originate from the Eastern Cape (formerly known as the Transkei), a neighbouring 
province to KwaZulu-Natal’s southern border. Many amaXhosa migrated from the Eastern Cape to KwaZulu-
Natal. AmaZulu are from the province of KwaZulu-Natal. 
11 At the time of fieldwork, permanent residents were not eligible for a housing subsidy (see footnote 2), but 
respondents considered that it was possible for any rules on the allocation of subsidy-built housing to be 
circumvented by settlement leaders. 
12 In Rubin’s (2011:482) study of perceptions of corruption in Gauteng she reports her respondents’ 
experiences of being denied access to subsidy-built housing because of their party political membership. 
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(Kagwanja and Waititu, 2008). Zuma’s image stands in contrast to the image of the man he replaced 
–Thabo Mbeki, an isiXhosa-speaker whose projected identity, captured by his ‘I am African’ speech13, 
spoke against ethnic divides in favour of a national identity. While the contest for power between 
the two men was clearly based on issues other than ethnicity and its role in the future of South 
Africa, the result of their high-level contest has factionalised the ANC with at least two important 
implications at the local level14. The first, as reported in the State of Local Government Report 
(GoRSA, CoGTA, 2009), Mbeki supporters and Zuma supporters have been polarised on issues that 
include the very future of the ANC, which has created “[r]elationships at the local level [that] are 
tainted by these contestations amongst the elites of local areas” (2009:30). When viewed alongside 
“A culture of patronage and nepotism [that] is now so widespread in many municipalities that the 
formal municipal accountability system is ineffective and inaccessible to many citizens” (ibid, p.31), it 
is possible to infer national contests for power affect the ability of citizens to access local sites of 
power. The second (and perhaps more worrying) effect is that ANC factionalism has been 
interpreted by some grassroots activists resident in the study sites as an ethnic rivalry. Commenting 
on national politics, a young Zulu male, member of the ANC Youth League, and resident in Cato Crest 
stated that, “for me, Thabo Mbeki hates us, not just him, but a certain percentage of his group 
totally hate Zulus ... And not just him, from the Zulu faction too, there are leaders whom we know 
who don’t get along with anyone from the Eastern Cape. ... I wouldn’t say [Jacob Zuma’s] a guy who 
has troubles against anyone, or is a guy who has a tribal background. [But] his election has (and I 
can’t not say it has not) encouraged people who think like that, that our time has come. ... I think 
Zuma has influenced a lot of people [here]. I hear a lot of people say, ‘ah Zuma, yes, that’s it, that’s 
what we’re talking about!’” (Interview A, 31/03/10). The respondent was unclear as to what “our 
time has come” meant in terms of the upgrade programme. A possible interpretation is that under 
the presidency of Zuma, amaZulus are seen to be given (or ought to be given) preferential 
treatment. 
The third criterion of South Africans over foreigners is influenced by country-wide debate on the role 
of foreigners in South African society and concerns of xenophobia. Sichone (2008) argues that 
xenophobic acts reported across the country in 2008 were closely related to a sense of entitlement 
and loss of entitlement among South Africans. Attacks on foreigners in urban areas, he argues, are 
part of a “struggle for space, jobs and other resources” (2008:258). The respondent from Cato Crest 
cited earlier said: “I expect this xenophobic violence to happen again. In Zulu we have an idiom: 
where water once ran, it will come through and run again. So with these attacks, there is a danger 
they will come back again, and even be bigger than before. Because there are still these issues. ... 
You know the problem that [South] Africans have with foreigners is that they get paid less than we 
do, so we lose out on jobs. These issues are there” (Interview A, 31/03/10). Although xenophobia 
can be dated to earlier periods of South African history, Sichone argues that in recent years, “ethnic 
identity among the poor has become sharper as their sense of civic identity and citizenship has been 
disappointed by the failure of the new state to deliver a ‘better life for all’” (2008:258).  
                                                          
13 Mbeki made the speech whilst Deputy President in 1996. Part of the speech that best reflects a pan-South 
African identity goes: “I am the grandchild of the warrior men and women that Hintsa and Sekhukhune led, the 
patriots that Cetshwayo and Mphephu took to battle, the soldiers Moshoeshoe and Ngungunyane taught 
never to dishonour the cause of freedom.” (from Mbeki, 2004:9) 
14 The contest for power came to a head in 2007 at the ANC national conference in Polokwane when Jacob 
Zuma ousted Thabo Mbeki as leader of the ANC following a vote of no confidence awarding Zuma the mandate 
to stand as the ANC candidate for president in the 2009 elections. 
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Where the politics of process is grounded to specific spatial contexts, the politics of preference 
carries a scalar element which shows that the power exercised by local elites and the enactment of 
their subjectivities speaks to national and regional forces. An analysis of how issues and tensions at 
national and regional level are made and re-made at the local level is only touched upon here; a 
detailed study is necessary to illuminate the workings of local elites but is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
3.2 Citizen experiences of the housing allocation process: Navigating the politics of process 
and preference 
3.2.1 Evidence to support criteria of process 
Process-oriented criteria primarily refer to ‘cut off’ dates in settlements targeted for in situ upgrade. 
In Gum Tree Road settlement in north Durban, a cut-off date of 2008 was set by the municipality in 
consultation with its CDC. At the time of fieldwork, this settlement was at the feasibility stage of the 
upgrade process. In Cato Crest a cut-off date of 1998 was set by the municipality. This settlement, 
less than 5km from Durban’s central business district, was in the implementation stage of the 
upgrade process. There had been continual delay to the phased upgrade, resulting in a settlement 
that is part shacks, part subsided housing and part transit camp (a holding residence between a 
shack and a house). In Zwelisha, a settlement 35km north of Durban, a housing list was developed in 
2004 ahead of the upgrade’s implementation phase in 2005. The location and size of the settlement 
meant that sufficient land was available to accommodate all eligible residents. This meant that post-
2005 arrivals were assessed for their eligibility to an in situ upgraded house on a case by case basis. 
At the time of fieldwork, implementation had been completed in Zwelisha. In all three settlements, 
the CDC had been charged with developing a housing list of residents who were eligible in terms of 
national criteria and the cut-off date.  
In the absence of written records, evidence of residence prior to the cut-off dates came from 
residents’ narratives of origin and identity labels such as ‘early settler’ or ‘first settler’. Because the 
residence of many people pre-dated the settlement leaders charged with developing the housing 
list, residents’ own narratives of origin had to have been widely accepted by others. Those residents 
who had built their own shacks had the most compelling narrative. A typical ‘first settler’ narrative 
was: “Back then you just clear the bush and build a house” (Interview B, Gum Tree Road, 15/03/10). 
Later, as more people arrived, new residents reported that they had to ask neighbours and those 
already settled in the area for permission to stay. One such woman recalled, “I talked to the 
community and I found space, then I built my shack” (Interview C, Gum Tree Road, 29/03/10). The 
mode of settlement shaped the network of verification. Dependence on such oral histories meant 
that good neighbourly relations were essential for residents to validate their tenure claims. In Gum 
Tree Road, there was a widespread belief that the housing list had been developed by the 
settlement leaders on the principle of who came first. Therefore, ability to demonstrate their 
identity as ‘first settler’ or ‘early settler’ left these respondents confident that they will be able to 
access subsidised housing through upgrade process. 
However, there were instances when narratives of origin were insufficient. Also in Gum Tree Road, 
one respondent described himself as an early settler. He and his girlfriend had moved to the 
settlement in its early years in the mid-1980s. They had asked the permission of those around them 
and then built a shack. There was no dispute that this respondent was an early settler with an 
February 2015 
14 
 
entitlement to housing that stood equal to his neighbours. However, he was also a foreigner. Born in 
Malawi, he had been living in South Africa for over 30 years and had two South African children 
through his relationship with his South African girlfriend. Although (according to official criteria at 
the time of fieldwork) he was not eligible for a housing subsidy, his South African girlfriend was. 
Nevertheless, other residents, particularly members of the CDC, were keen to ensure that even if the 
rules changed he would remain ineligible and would not benefit directly or indirectly from the 
housing subsidy. In 2008, settlement leaders were helping the municipality to enumerate shacks and 
identify eligible owners. This respondent’s shack was registered in the name of a settlement leader’s 
daughter, even though she lived elsewhere. The respondent and his family were not present at the 
time, because also in 2008 country-wide xenophobic violence had forced them to temporarily flee 
the settlement until tensions had died down. On his return, he exclaimed that he would have liked 
to have the opportunity to make a case for a subsidy-built house to the municipality. He said, “I think 
I deserve a [subsidy-built] house – although I’m a foreigner I deserve to get something here. I’ve 
been living in Gum Tree Road and even Durban a long time; I’m like a South African. I even have 
children here” (Interview D, Gum Tree Road, 17/04/10). His expression of a right to housing is based 
on a conception of citizenship that expresses both legal entitlement to housing for his South African 
children, and his moral right to membership to society based on ‘deserving’ something after many 
years of contributing to that society. However, this was against popular sentiment. In the 
competition for scarce resources, actions of settlement leaders that contravene both the official 
process (national eligibility criteria) and local extra criteria (those resident before a cut-off date) 
carry popular appeal.  
Gum Tree Road is an ethnically mixed settlement with many amaXhosa and amaZulu residents. The 
discourse of citizenship and corresponding entitlement to housing (as safeguarded in the 
Constitution) is strong in the settlement, to the exclusion of foreigners and those who live with 
foreigners. For example, a female amaXhosa respondent framed her entitlement to upgrade entirely 
in terms of her formal citizenship. To her, voting is an act of buying into the state and thus becoming 
eligible for any benefits the state has to give. She said “I need a [subsidy-built] house. I am voting 
here, I am the citizen of South Africa” (Interview E, Gum Tree Road, 15/03/10). Another woman 
amaXhosa resident reiterated, “You don’t get [a house] if you don’t get ID, if you are not a South 
African citizen. But I have ID, I am a South African citizen” (Interview F, Gum Tree Road, 10/03/10). 
Lay discussions of the upgrade process unequivocally tie the discourse of citizenship, narrowly 
conceptualised as nationality, to entitlement to housing. As a result, there is a danger that the 
upgrade process may undermine the tenure security and physical safety of foreign residents, or 
create incentives for residents to reconceptualise citizenship to determine who is and is not a ‘good 
citizen’ and thus entitled to state resources. As an extra procedural measure to manage the numbers 
of people in upgraded settlements, the seemingly innocuous and apolitical ‘cut-off date’ is malleable 
to discriminatory agendas and exercises of mob and/or elite power in ways that compromise the 
idea of all citizens as holders of housing rights and with a right to housing. 
3.2.2 Evidence to support criteria of preference 
The evidence that residents call upon to demonstrate their ability to meet the criteria associated 
with settlement leaders’ preferences depend on how the former interpret the behaviour and 
statements of the latter. In Cato Crest, respondents widely believed that the upgrade process was 
being implemented by corrupt actors, and so, in addition to ‘legitimate’ extra criteria (e.g. a cut-off 
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date), many residents believed that access was achieved through relations with settlement leaders 
(the councillor and members of the Ward Committee15), because they were responsible for drawing 
up housing lists and allocating subsidy-built houses. An older male respondent said, “People can be 
taken off the [housing] list for no reason. [I know] because new people have been allocated houses 
and the old people [who have lived in here longer] are in transit camps. Who is on the housing list 
and stays there depends on their relationship with the Area and Ward Committee and the 
Councillor” (Interview H, Cato Crest, 06/10/09). Even after a housing list had been drawn up, he 
believed that the local councillor and Ward Committee were manipulating the allocation of houses. 
In his view, corner houses are the most desirable because there is more space to extend them, but 
“these houses are given to friends of the Committee and Councillor” (ibid).  
To make a case to access the upgrade, many residents emphasised aspects of their identity, 
particularly party political affiliation, to appeal to the local councillor and Ward Committee. One 
respondent, a 59 year old woman, who was living in a transit camp in Cato Crest and had witnessed 
some of the worst party-political violence in the province in the 1980s, stated a belief that tenure 
security and personal safety are directly related to political allegiance. On the basis of this belief, she 
had joined the IFP when she lived in rural KwaZulu-Natal. She recalled: “I had no interest in any 
political party. Eventually I did have to get a card. We lived in a side that was predominantly IFP. So 
eventually I had to buy an IFP membership card. Not that I believed in the IFP, just for safety. I don’t 
know even one policy” (Interview I, Cato Crest, 13/04/10). Sometime after moving to Cato Crest in 
1996, she had joined the ANC. Her experiences of the upgrade and local politics in Cato Crest 
supported her belief that party membership is necessary to live in safety and hold on to one’s 
resources. She claimed, “in this transit camp area, people will join the ANC because it is an ANC-
dominated area” (ibid). In the upgrade process in Cato Crest, relocation to the transit camp was 
determined by the local ANC councillor and ANC-dominated Ward Committee. This respondent 
explicitly tied the allocation of state resources to party political allegiance.  
In Zwelisha, there was a perception among some residents that the upgrade was intended to benefit 
only amaZulus. This perception stemmed from the history of the settlement and the identity of its 
leadership. The first settlers in Zwelisha arrived in the mid-1980s from the Transkei. All were Xhosa-
speaking. Many arrived without identity documents or the correct apartheid-era permits to live in 
Durban, which later stalled their applications for housing subsidies and delayed their occupation of a 
subsidy-built house. By the end of the 1980s, there was a growing presence of amaZulu in the 
settlement as a result of displacement caused by province-wide communal violence. These new 
settlers resented the influence and power of the Xhosa-speakers in a mainly Zulu-speaking province. 
Since the mid-1990s, the ethnic composition of the leadership has altered, reflecting the changes in 
Zwelisha’s ethnic demographic. The new leaders lobbied the municipality and local councillor for the 
settlement to be upgraded, but the old leaders did not, because the latter were mostly landlords 
and expected to incur financial losses if the land was re-parcelled. The contemporary contest for 
leadership is framed as a struggle between ‘new’ and ‘old’ settlers, with the former dominating 
positions in the settlement leadership and driving the upgrade process (which concluded in 2009). In 
                                                          
15 The settlement’s CDC was considered by all respondents to be weak and almost non-existent. They claimed 
that decisions made about the upgrade under community participation principles were made by members of 
the Ward Committee, which in turn was dominated by members of the ANC’s branch committee. 
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2010, many of the original settlers and their families were still living on the periphery of the 
settlement in shacks, waiting for the paperwork to prove their eligibility for a housing subsidy. 
Although CDC members in Zwelisha insisted that they were trying to help all those eligible for the 
process, including ‘old settlers’, the amaXhosa respondent in the study felt uneasy. While she had 
accessed a house through the upgrade, she had noticed that those who were still living in shacks 
were overwhelmingly amaXhosa and it made her wonder aloud if amaZulu in the settlement were 
keeping resources for themselves. She recalled being asked, in isiXhosa, by amaXhosa residents in 
shacks as she walked past how it was that she had managed to obtain a subsidy-built house when 
they had not (Interview J, Zwelisha, 09/06/10). Although the respondent did not articulate anything 
more than a sense of discomfort with the possible relationship between ethnicity and the housing 
subsidy, given the history of the settlement, this may be a source of future tension among Zwelisha’s 
residents.  
4. Conclusion 
Within a global and national drive for inclusive citizenship, this paper traced the devolution of power 
over housing delivery and allocation from central to local government and through to settlement 
level actors.  As illustrated in the case studies, at the neighbourhood level intense competition for 
housing, alongside ‘participatory’ processes dominated by settlement leaders, has resulted in a 
housing allocation process that, when implemented, breeds competition among residents along 
existing social fault lines of ethnicity, nationality and party political contest, which, this paper argues, 
undermines the ideals of inclusive citizenship. In a state-centric view of housing allocation for 
inclusive citizenship, tremendous emphasis is placed on devolved housing delivery and the 
structured participation of housing beneficiaries. Yet, in a context where the supply of subsidised 
housing is unable to meet the numbers of eligible citizens, localised criteria based on a politics of 
process and preference allows for a discriminatory agenda among settlement leaders where citizens 
favoured along the lines of their ethnicity, nationality and party political affiliation are able to realise 
their legal housing rights, while others are denied. Also, by basing eligibility to subsidised housing on 
nationality and a formal citizenship, not only are foreigners (and their South African families) denied 
housing in ways that may encourage xenophobia, but it also undermines a bottom-up conception of 
inclusive citizenship based on marginalised groups (irrespective of their legal status) expressing and 
enacting a moral and social right to housing that draws upon the idea of all people as rights-bearers 
and the right to self-determination.  
The perceptible tensions that influence housing allocation carry implications beyond a compromised 
inclusive citizenship. In localised processes of housing allocation where there are insufficient checks 
on local power, they may be sowing seeds of conflict by propagating and exploiting existing social 
tensions. Because of a lack of oversight, settlement leaders are afforded tremendous opportunities 
to manipulate the allocation of resources and social divides, with the risk that social tensions 
manipulated by leaders can lead to “extremely violent conflict outcomes” and thus contribute to a 
condition of protracted civic conflict (Beall et al., 2013:3077). As noted earlier, civic conflict refers to 
the contests and clashes that arise when the state (or those with the authority to act on the state’s 
behalf e.g. members of committees engaged in a public process) are believed to have failed in 
upholding the state’s responsibilities to citizens. These conflicts need not be violent, but as Moser 
and Horn (2011:9) warn, conflict in ‘small’ events such as perceived injustice in housing allocation, 
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can ‘tip over’ into violence “within the context of a larger system that is already on the edge of 
criticality”, such as a housing crisis exemplified by an ever growing backlog.  
In response to the immediate implications of a compromised inclusive citizenship, a key lesson from 
eThekwini, which may be helpful to the design and implementation of upgrade strategies in other 
places, is that where participatory processes are employed to strengthen civic engagement and 
engender inclusive citizenship, they need to be transparent and subject to oversight from both 
above and below through systems of checks and balances on the power of local elites.  
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to the organisers of a workshop on urban land and conflict held at the University of 
Manchester in March 2013, and the workshop participants for their invaluable comments on the 
first iteration of this paper. I am particularly appreciative of the efforts of Melanie Lombard and 
Carole Rakodi for their editorial guidance throughout. Finally, I am most indebted to three 
anonymous reviewers whose rich and insightful comments undoubtedly improved the paper. Any 
remaining weaknesses likely stem from not taking their comments further. 
Funding 
This research was made possible by a grant from the Economic and Social Research Council. Grant 
number ES/G0170691/1] 
References 
Alsayyad, N. and A. Roy (2006) ‘Medieval modernity: On citizenship and urbanism in a global era’, 
Space and Polity, 10(1):1–20. 
Beall, J., T. Goodfellow and D. Rodgers (2013) ‘Cities and Conflict in Fragile States in the Developing 
World’, Urban Studies, 50(15):3065-3083. 
Beall, J. (2000) ‘From the culture of poverty to inclusive cities: reframing urban policy and politics’, 
Journal of International Development, 12(6):843-56. 
Bengtsson, B. (2001) ‘Housing as a Social Right: Implications for Welfare State Theory’, Scandinavian 
Political Studies, 24(4):255-275. 
Bénit-Gbaffou, C. (2012) ‘Party politics, civil society and local democracy – Reflections from 
Johannesburg’, Geoforum, 43(2):178–189.  
Benjamin, S. (2008) ‘Occupancy Urbanism: Radicalizing Politics and Economy beyond Policy and 
Programs’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 32:719–729. 
Bentley, K. and A. Habib (Eds.) (2008) Racial Redress & Citizenship in South Africa, Cape Town: 
Human Sciences Research Council Press  
Boonyabancha, S. (2005) ‘Baan Mankong: going to scale with “slum” and squatter upgrading in 
Thailand’, Environment and Urbanization, 17(1):21-46. 
Bredenoord, J, P. van Lindert and P. Smets (Eds.) (2014) Affordable Housing in the Urban Global 
South: Seeking sustainable solutions, Abingdon/New York: Routledge  
February 2015 
18 
 
Chitekwe-Biti, B. Patel, S. and D. Mitlin (2014) ‘The trans-national experience of community-led 
development’ in Bredenoord et al. (Eds.) Affordable Housing in the Urban Global South: Seeking 
sustainable solutions, Abingdon/New York: Routledge, pp.117-132. 
Cooke, B. and U. Kothari (2001) ‘The case for participation as tyranny’ in B. Cooke and U. Kothari 
(Eds.) Participation: The new tyranny?, London: Zed Books, pp.1-15. 
Desai, R. and R. Sanyal (Eds.) (2012) Urbanising Citizenship, New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Financial and Fiscal Commission (2012) ‘Building an Inclusionary Housing Market: Shifting the 
Paradigm for Housing Delivery in South Africa’, Midrand: Financial and Fiscal Commission. 
Gilbert, A. (2004) ‘Helping the poor through housing subsidies: lessons from Chile, Colombia and 
South Africa’, Habitat International, 28(1):13–40. 
Goebel., A. (2007) ‘Sustainable Urban Development? Low-cost housing challenges in South Africa’, 
Habitat International 31:291-302. 
Goodlad, R. (1996) ‘The Housing Challenge in South Africa’, Urban Studies, 33(9):1629–1646.  
Gordon, R., A. Bertoldi and M. Nell (2011) ‘Housing Subsidy Assets: Exploring the performance of 
government subsidised housing in South Africa’, report prepared by Shisaka Development 
Management Services for the FinMark Trust, Urban LandMark, National Department of Human 
Settlements, Western Cape Department of Human Settlements, the South African Cities Network, 
and the FB Heron Foundation.  
Government of the Republic of South Africa (GoRSA) (2009) ‘The National Housing Code’, 
Department of Housing/ Department of Human Settlements. Available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov.za/content.php?pagename=National-Housing-Code Accessed 21/09/13. 
GoRSA/Co-operative Governance and Traditional Affairs (CoGTA) (2009) ‘State of Local Government 
in South Africa: Overview Report’. Available at: 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=110100. Accessed 01/08/13. 
GoRSA/Department of Human Settlements (DoHS) (2004) ‘Comprehensive plan for developing 
sustainable human settlements: Breaking new ground. Available at: 
http://www.capegateway.gov.za/Text/2005/10/discussion_document_20051018.pdf.  Accessed 
18/02/09. 
GoRSA (1997) ‘Housing Act’. Available at: 
http://www.gov.za/documents/index.php?term=housing&dfrom=&dto=&yr=1997&tps%5B%5D=1&
subjs%5B%5D=0. Accessed 01/08/14. 
GoRSA (1996) ‘Constitution of the Republic of South Africa’. Available at: 
http://www.info.gov.za/documents/constitution/1996/a108-96.pdf. Accessed 26/08/13. 
GoRSA (1995) ‘A new housing policy and strategy for South Africa’. Available at: 
http://www.dhs.gov.za/Content/planned/Docs/Housing%20White%20Paper.pdf. Accessed 
18/02/09. 
Holston, J. and A. Appadurai (1999) ‘Introduction: Cities and Citizenship’ in J. Holston (Ed.) Cities and 
Citizenship Durham (NC): Duke University Press, pp.1-20. 
Holston, J. (2008) Insurgent Citizenship: Disjunctions of Democracy and Modernity in Brazil. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press 
February 2015 
19 
 
Huchzermeyer, M. (2004) Unlawful Occupation: Informal Settlements and Urban Policy in South 
Africa and Brazil, Trenton NJ: Africa World Press 
Huchzermeyer, M. (2014) ‘Changing housing policy in South Africa’ in Bredenoord et al. (Eds.) 
Affordable Housing in the Urban Global South: Seeking sustainable solutions, Abingdon/New York: 
Routledge, pp.336-348. 
Jenkins, P. and H. Smith (2001) ‘An Institutional Approach to Analysis of State Capacity in Housing 
Systems in the Developing World: Case Studies in South Africa and Costa Rica’, Housing Studies, 
16(4), 485–507.  
Kabeer, N. (Ed.) (2005) Inclusive Citizenship: Meanings and Expressions, London: Zed Books. 
Kagwanja, P. and E. Waititu (2008) ‘South Africa: ANC headed for split as ethnic tension rises’, 
Opinion piece for the Africa Policy Institute, 29/10/08. 
King, P. (2003) A social philosophy of housing, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
Kota-Fredericks, L (2013) Speaking notes given at speech to the South Africa - Netherlands Research 
Programme on Alternatives in Development Conference, Durban, 25-27 July 2013. Available At: 
http://www.dhs.gov.za/uploads/DM_SANPAD_SPEAKING_NOTES.pdf. Accessed 01/08/13. 
Lalloo, N. (1999) ‘Arenas of Contested Citizenship: Housing Policy in South Africa’, Habitat 
International, 23(1):35–47. 
Landman, K. and M. Napier (2010) ‘Waiting for a house or building your own? Reconsidering state 
provision, aided and unaided self-help in South Africa’, Habitat International, 34(3):299–305. 
Lister, R. (2007) ‘Inclusive Citizenship: Realizing the Potential’, Citizenship Studies, 11(1):49–61. 
Lund, C. (2011) ‘Land Rights and Citizenship in Africa’, Discussion Paper 65, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 
(Nordic Africa Institute (NAI)), Uppsala: NAI. 
Marshall, T.H. and T. Bottomore (1992) [1950] Citizenship and Social Class, London: Pluto Press, pp. 
3-51. 
Mayer, M. (2012) ‘The “right to the city” in urban social movements’ in N. Brenner, P. Marcuse and 
M. Mayer (Eds.) Cities for People, Not for Profit: Critical Urban Theory and the Right to the City, 
Abingdon/New York: Routledge, pp.63-85 
Mbeki, T. (2004) ‘I am an African’, African Renaissance, 1(2):9-13 
Memela, M. (2009) ‘Youth leader assassinated at his home’, The Sowetan LIVE. Available at: 
http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/sowetan/archive/2009/01/26/youth-leader-assassinated-at-his-
home, January 26 2009. Accessed 21/08/13).  
Miraftab, F. (2003) ‘The Perils of Participatory Discourse: Housing Policy in Post-apartheid South 
Africa’, Journal of Planning Education and Research, 22(3):226–239. 
Miraftab, F. (2009) ‘Insurgent Planning: Situating Radical Planning in the Global South’, Planning 
Theory, 8(1):32–50. 
Moser, C. and P. Horn (2011) Understanding the tipping point of urban conflict: conceptual 
framework paper, Working paper 1, Global Urban Research Centre, Manchester: University of 
Manchester.  
February 2015 
20 
 
Nene, N. (2013) ‘KZN protest leader shot 12 times’, Daily News (Newspaper), 27 June 2013. Available 
online at: http://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/kzn-protest-leader-shot-12-times-1.1538500  
Orkin, M. (1995) ‘Building democracy in the new South Africa: civil society, citizenship and political 
ideology’, Review of African Political Economy, 22(66):525–537.  
Patel, K. (2012) Tenure and vulnerability: The effects of changes to tenure security on the identity and 
social relationships of the urban poor. University of Birmingham. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis. 
Patel, K. (2013) ‘A successful slum upgrade in Durban: A case of formal change and informal 
continuity’, Habitat International, 40:211-217. 
Parnell, S. and E. Pieterse (2010) ‘The “Right to the City”: Institutional Imperatives of a 
Developmental State’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 34(1):146-162. 
Roy, A. (2009) ‘Why India Cannot Plan Its Cities: Informality, Insurgence and the Idiom of 
Urbanization’, Planning Theory, 8(1):76–87. 
Rubin, M. (2011) ‘Perceptions of Corruption in the South African Housing Allocation and Delivery 
Programme: What It May Mean for Accessing the State’, Journal of Asian and African Studies, 
46(5):479–490.  
Sanyal, B. and V. Mukhija (2001) ‘Institutional Pluralism and Housing Delivery: A Case of Unforeseen 
Conflicts in Mumbai , India’, World Development 29(12):2043-2057.Sichone, O. (2008) ‘Xenophobia’ 
in Nick Shepherd and Steven Robins (eds.) New South African Keywords, Auckland Park (SA): Jacana 
Media, pp. 225-263. 
Staeheli, L. A. (2010) ‘Political geography: Where’s citizenship?’ Progress in Human Geography, 
35(3):393–400. 
Terreblanche, S. (2012) Lost in Transformation: South Africa’s search for a new future since 1986, 
Sandton: KMM Review Publications 
Tissington, K., N. Munshi, G. Mirugi-Mukundi and E. Durojaye (2013) “Jumping the Queue”, Waiting 
lists and other myths: Perceptions and Practice around Housing Demand and Allocation in South 
Africa. Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape/ Socio-Economic Rights Institute of 
South Africa (SERI). 
Tomlinson, M. R. (2011) ‘Managing the risk in housing delivery: Local government in South Africa’, 
Habitat International, 35(3):419–425.  
UN-Habitat (2009) International Guidelines on Decentralisation and Strengthening of Local 
Authorities, Nairobi: United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat). 
Williams, J. (2005) ‘The Grootboom case and the constitutional right to housing: the politics of 
planning in post-apartheid South Africa’ in Kabeer, N. (Ed.) Inclusive Citizenship: Meanings and 
Expressions. London: Zed Books, pp.219-234. 
 
